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The red mud reservoir failure in Ajka, Hungary has claimed 10 lives and cost millions of dollars in damages.  Immediately after 
emergency measures investigations started to shed light on causes and circumstances.  The authors performed an extensive desktop 
study of about 20 thousand pages reaching back to the 1970s, when the facility has been designed. 
Beside this study the dam and its area have gone through series of site investigations, from drilling to CPTu testing and laboratory 
testing.  The information so collected resulted in the following conclusion. 
Contributing factors to this substantial dam failure included poor siting of the facility, partly on top of a diverted creek bed and marshy 
area; design faults when calculating safety reserves, as well as basic stability at designed maximum reservoir load.  Construction 
technology has not been controlled; its foundation was built unprofessionally.  The negligence of regulators at licensing, at 
commissioning, as well as at the periodic safety reviews.  There was no geotechnical monitoring plan, it was considered to be 
unnecessary.  External negative factors further converged with these deficiencies.  The frequency of smaller earthquakes was 
significantly higher in the accident-preceding year than during the previous ten years.  Precipitation was unusual, its level during the 
accident-preceding half year reached an incidence frequency of 3000 years!  Heightened groundwater level saturated the clay base 
surface of the reservoir already weakened by cat-ion exchanges due to high alkalinity of red mud – on sloping surface.  The slurry 
walls built around the reservoir, from environmental protection purpose, have intensified this process.  Strong wind gusts shifting 





On October 4th, 2010, at 12:14, near Kolontár, Hungary, the 
worst industrial accident happened in the country’s history.  
The north-western corner of the No. 10 red mud reservoir, 
operated by the Hungarian Aluminium Production and 
Trading Company (MAL Zrt), broke, with tragic 
consequences. 
As a result of the dam rapture, hundreds of thousand cubic 
meters highly alkaline (around 13 pH) red mud and 
technological water flooded the surroundings: various parts of 
the municipalities of Kolontár, Devecser, and Somlóvásárhely 
along the Torna creek valley (see Figure 1.).  The catastrophe 
resulted in 10 casualties, while 286 persons had to be treated 
by medical personnel, damaged 367 properties, and covered 
1017 hectares land. 
Based on existing information, there was no sing of the rapture 
before the even occurred.  There was no premonitory requiring 
action (e.g. seepage of red mud, cracks in the dam structure, 
scaling slope) noticed during the daily and other regular expert 
walkouts and other checks, therefore the event occurred 
unexpectedly. 
 
Fig. 1. satellite image of the flooded are by NASA October 9, 
2010 
 
It is also important to note that never during the operation of 
reservoir No. 10 its designed and permitted maximum storage 
level of red mud and water has been exceeded. 
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Data used for analyses 
 
The management of MAL zrt has contracted our company to 
study all available documentation relevant to this event, going 
back to three decades (approximately consisting of 20 
thousand pages) and all the information collected after the 
accident by various experts and institutes, via geotechnical 
investigations (117 boreholes and CPTu with the total length 
of 2006 m), and processing of laboratory test results.  This 
manuscript is based on all these information. 
 
 
Short history of MAL Zrt 
 
Through the privatisation process along the socio-economic 
changes in Central and East Europe, the privy of the 
Hungarian Aluminium Trust, the National Privatization and 
Trustee Co. and its 100% owned Hungalu Co. has privatized 
the Ajka Aluminium Industry Ltd, which was, in those times, 
one of the frontrunners in Hungarian alum earth (aluminium 
oxide) production.  Since the privatization the company has 
got transformed a number of times until it became MAL Zrt, 
establish in 1995 by private investors. 
Utilizing the vast amount of economically producible bauxite 
the company has grown to become one of the biggest 
industrial complexes, employing 6000 workers.  70-75% od 
the company’s products are sold for West European export. 
 
 
OUTLINE OF THE SITE 
 
The Ajka Alum Earth Factory has got built in 1942-1943, 
based on the bauxite and coal deposits found in the area.  The 
facility is situated in Veszprém County, Hungary, in the south-
west suburb of Ajka municipality, next to the Budapest-
Szombathely railway corridor.  There is railway line north of 
the factory, and behind it stands the slag and ash repository of 
the Bakony Power Plant, plus some houses.  To the east there 
is the power plant, to the south there are agricultural lands and 
to the west there are the red mud reservoirs of the MAL Zrt 
(see Figure 2). 
 
 
Fig 2. MAL Zrt. and its surroundings (Google) 
 
There has been 11 red mud reservoirs (I—X and X/A) built up 
till now on this industrial site of which I-V are situated inside 
Ajka, in the factory site, while reservoirs VI-X/A lay between 
Ajka and Kolontár on the right side the the road to Kolontár.   
Reservoirs VI-VIII have got recultivated already, while this 
process is still on at reservoir IX.  On the recultivated surface 
of reservoir VIII, MAL Zrt plans to deposit more red mud 
resulted from dry technology processing.  Figure 3. shows the 
layout of red mud reservoirs VI-X/A. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Layout of the reservoirs 
 
0,8 - 1,5 km to the north of the reservoirs Kolontár and 2,5 - 
3,0 km to the southeast Padragkút municipalities can be found.  
Torna creek is situated on the south side of the reservoirs, into 
which Csinger creek flows.  The original, natural path of 
Torna creek has run on the north side of the reservoirs. 
The entire industrial site of MAL Zrt is over 250 hectares (ha), 
of which 62 ha is factory and 174 ha is red mud reservoir. The 




HISTORY OF RESERVOIR X 
 
In Hungary aluminium oxide production is based on the Bauer 
technology, resulting in up till now non-reusable high volume, 
highly alkaline red mud „waste”.  Its volume is twice as large 
as the aluminium oxide produced, therefor required huge 
landfill sites.  This red mud has special physical properties, 
similar to clay, binding caustic soda, iron and water.  Along 
geotechnical soil characterization (particle distribution for 
grainy, plasticity index for more bind soils) it can be 
considered for both grainy (mud or powdery sand) and bind 
(clay).  Its water content remains relatively stabile for a long 
time, so in the deeper layers even years later it is between 30 
to 40 per cent.  The top layer, after extended dry period, starts 
to heavily crack. 
Production capacity has been increased in the 1970s.  During 
those times reservoir VIII has been filled up till 1981.  After 
that reservoir IX has got operated till 2000.  Still during its 
operation as a government organization the company has got 
the design study for its red mud deposition prepared by a 
design firm (designer) in 1980. 
All together ten sites have been considered (from „A” to „J”), 
from which site „I” has been assigned, as the result of a 
tedious regulatory process, to establish future reservoir X.  
This siting process was disputed from the 1980s amongst the 
political leaders of those times, the company and the 
communities of the surroundings (1). The interests of local 
people have got ignored, superseded by economic and political 
interests.  The company has been one of the major economic 
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players in the country.  Therefore the selection process of its 
waste site has been based mostly of its perceived economic 
and technical benefits in the communist state.  Considerations 
of potential human casualties in an industrial accident have not 
been high on the list of decision-makers. 
The groundwater pollution resulting from reservoirs VI-IX has 
become known during those times, as the reservoirs have not 
got sealed.  The regulator ordered to stop further pollution, so 
the company has contracted designer to prepare a study for 
suitable intervention.  Based on due engineering geological 
investigations, limiting further pollution effectively and 
economically required underground corrective measures.  
Having considered 8 different alternative measures the choice 
was to erect diaphragm walls around reservoirs VI-X. 
After commissioning reservoir IX the pollution became so 
severe that it has started to endanger the local drinking water 
base.  Various interventions have been made: 
• Diaphragm walls for vertical seal 
• Water level observation wells 
• Trench system inside the diaphragm walls 
• Trench system outside the diaphragm walls 
 
Elements of the environmental protection system: 
(a) Vertical closures (diaphragm wall) 
(b) Collection system for polluted waters 
(c) Collection system for clean water 
(d) Monitoring systems 
  
(a) Vertical closures  
Retaining walls have been constructed in a number of phases, 
in all together 7.400 m length, between 1987 and 2001, and 
the walls were totally closed the reservoir area.  
 
(b) Collection system for polluted waters: 
• Trenches (leachate trenches) 
• Collection basins 
 
(c) Collection system for clean water: 
• Tósoki basin 
• Northern seepage system 
 
(d) Monitoring systems: 
• Observation wells 
• Dug wells 
• Surface sampling points 
• Leachate sampling points 
• Waste sinking level measurement points  
Parallel to the environmental protection retaining walls, was 
the design of reservoir X. In its theoretical licensing plan 
(April 1984) the height of the continuously hydraulically 
constructed dams, from the slag and ash of the local power 
plant, would have reached 41,5 - 43,5 m with 1:1 slope 
incline. Thus the maximum height of the 10 m wide dam crest 
would reach 235,5 m.a.s.l (meter above the Baltic sea).  The 
maximum allowed level for red mud fill would have been 
234,5 m.a.s.l, resulting in 13M m3  red mud storage capacity.  
The close to flat terrain slanted towards the west.  The average 
slant in the valley was 5-8 per cent.  The highest point at the 
nothestern corner was about 197,5 m.a.s.l and the lowest at the 
western wall was 191,0 m.a.s.l. 
Dam construction was planned in two phases:  
Phase I: to level 216,00 m.a.s.l (with level 215,0 m.a.s.l red 
mud fill),  
Phase II: to level 235,50 m.a.s.l (with level 234, 5 m.a.s.l red 
mud fill). 
Later, fortunately, these planned heights have been rejected, 
and in the Detailed geotechnical expert report of January 1990 
„only” 216,50 m.a.s.l dam crown height has been noted, 
meaning a maximum of 25 m dam height, with 1:1 slope 
incline on the northern and southern walls and 1:2 slope 
incline on the external side of the western wall. 
First licencing for constructing reservoir X was awarded in 
1993, which was started in the same year with the technology 
used at reservoir IX.  Phese I was concluded in 1995 reaching 
205,00 m.a.s.l dam crown level with 1:1 slope incline.  The 
slag and ash tailing conductor has been built, as well as 
slanted water sinks on both the eastern and southern sides.  
Then phase II was started buildin up the dam to level 216,5 
m.a.s.l, and widening the western walls due to recultivation 
prescriptions with 1:2 slope incline and a 5 m wide berm.  The 
bottom width of the so built dam system varied between 50 
and 80 m, depending on terrain conditions.  The designed 
height of the dams varied between 21 and 25 m.  The are of 
the reservoir is approximately 19 ha, its final capacity at 
216,00 m.a.s.l filling level was circa 4,2-4,5M m3. 
The lengths of reservoir X are 657 m on north, 581 m on west, 
269 m on south, and 405 m on east. 
In 1998 the filling of reservoir X has started. Red mud, diluted 
with process water in 1:5 ratio has been transported to the 
reservoir via pipe system from the factory site. The red mud 
has been blown circularly to the inner slopes of the reservoir 
for slushing the surface. This increases water retaining 
properties.  Ideally the water depth increases from the edges to 
the centre inside the reservoir.  Till the end of 2009 3.405.000 
m3   materia has got deposited. 
As the factory has used up all its reservoir capacities during 
years of operation, it had no space for further expansion, 
except to increase the dam crown to an even height across the 
existing reservoir walls. The construction of reservoir X has 
started with the power plant ash fill up through a pipe between  
two smaller dams. The so created dam crown has not been on 
even level. The northern side has been lower from the start of 
construction.  As the red mud level increased this uneven hight 
became prevalent. Therefore the hightening of the norhtern 
wall became necessary in order to use the maximum designed 
and licenced capacity of the reservoir. This work has been 
completed in July 2010 with the use of materials from nearby 
ash storage. The once deposited and since cemented ash was 
broken by bulldozer clam-shell and put on top of the dam’s 
nortehrn wall. The broken cemented ash parts have been 
broken into smaller particles by the dozer blade, smoothened, 
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and then compressed by roller. This method produced 0.25-
0.30 m even layers. To increase compression efficiency, water 
has been sprinkled on the layers.  This way a relatively even 
and homogenious crown has been formed.  These have been 
performed in approximately 400 m length on the northern 
wall.  The sodden and humusy parts have been removed and 
corrected.  The entire work has been completed in about two 
weeks, using 5277 m3 materials.  The added layers’ thickness 
varied between 0.3 and 1.4 m.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
The red mud reservoir, the condition of the dams have been 
monitored by eye daily.  The dams vave been driven around 
by 4 x 4, looking for signs of wetting.  On each Mondays the 
level of liquid in the reservoir has been measured by the pump 
operators and data recorded.  There was never any sign 
recorded of a problem.  The appropriate flushing of red mud, 
and the condition of the pipe system has been checked upon 
twice daily. 
According to the records, on October 4th, 2010, at the time of 
the dam rapture, the level of tailings in the reservoir was at 
215,88 m.a.s.l, thus 0.12 m lower than its maxmum allowed 
level of 216,00 m.a.s.l.  The catastrophy occurred at 12:10 




CONSTRUCTION OF RESERVOIR X 
 
According to design, at the bottom of the dams, on both sides, 
an earthwork of 1,0 - 1,5 - 1,8 m height, 2,5 – 4,0 m crown 
width, and 1:1 and 1:1.5 m slope inclines had to be built.  This 
was necessary because the stabilization of slag-ash structure 
required some days and ill that these earth structures supported 
the tailing.  These earthworks have been prepared by dozer 
extracting and building up materials to the its left and right 
and thus taking off top soils to about 1 m depth.  The 
technology of this embankment construction is shown on 
Figure 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Dam building technology 
 
The Ø350 mud circular pipe was laid on the external dam side. 
According to the timing, the filling pipes branch off upward 
by extension. The dams were built of the slag-ash mud by 
hydromechanization. 
Upon the phase I. (phase between the earth dams) on the two 
brims of the dam by the use of a bulldozer, the dams of the 
next phases were constructed of its own material. In the same 
way were built the dams of the dam’s own material also in 
transversal direction, as sealing of the construction joints. As a 
consequence of the dam’s inclined surface, the superfluous 
water flew on the embankment into the provisional mud 
reservoir, at the sole of the western dam. Along the dam’s 
longitudinal side the heaped embankment material was loose. 
In the course of the construction the voids of this embankment 
were filled up with diluted mud. The outer, loose parts 
dropped down to the sole of the dam, or had been eroded 
during the years. When building the embankment, 
construction of a seepage collecting ditch system became also 
necessary, for collecting and returning the effluent water, 
which left the area and to introduce it into the secondary 
settling tank. 
Construction of the north dam started at its eastern end and 
proceeded toward the western dam. Before the pumping 
station, on the deepest point of the area, a reservoir was to be 
built for the returning mud water. It was pumped back with a 
pump into the factory. On the east dam of about 4 places took 
place, where the cross section changed. In the vicinity of the 
injection points the bigger grains of the mud, the slag settled 
down, the diluted ash material flew away, therefore the 
material of the dam is not of the same quality and homogenous 
at every place.  
The thickness of the dam’s cross section is not equal because 
near to the filling openings the mud, ejected at high pressure, 
spread out wider and extruded also laterally. At the meeting 
point of the dams IX. and X. started the construction of the 
dam on the circular pipe, therefore the highest pressure on the 
northern side was the highest. Consequently the northern dam 
is “undulating”. 
Depending from the weather, the settled slag-ash coagulates in 
a favourable dam material, its water permeability, by using a 
correct storage technology, practically ceases. 
When planning the eastern dam of the reservoir X. it was 
taken in consideration, that in the “immediate future” the 
construction of the next red mud reservoir is to be expected, 
therefore the north dam was built as an intermediate dam. In 
this sense its slope was 1 : 1 and the west dam, as the end 
toward village Kolontár, was built with a slope of 1 : 2. The 
motive of the omission of this extension, could not be 
deducted from the disposed documents. 
Into the reservoir X. during the construction, the red mud was 
already introduced. After this, the construction of the dam 
continued until the end of 2001. Due to alignment of the north 
dam’s crest, every dam of the reservoir X. reached the 
permitted level of 216,50 m.a.s.l. 
 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE DAM RAPTURE 
 
In the area of the reservoir from the morning of 4th October 
2010 a continuously increasing wind was blowing from 
southeast toward northwest. According to the testimonies, the 
water of the reservoir rippled, undulated, but did not hit the 
walls of the dam. According to the direction of wind, the 
waves travelled toward the corner, which broke later away. 
In the 6-month period before the wall failure, excessive 
volume of precipitation fell in this area. This heightened the 
ground water level and a significant amount of rainwater got 
in the area within the curtain walls. Consequently the water 
balance of the reservoir X. toppled in an unfavourable way. 
The water level, what became swollen by the curtain wall, and 
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the exceptional volume of the rainwater and seepage water, 
collecting in the seepage ditches were pumped regularly into 
the reservoir X. Such a big water quantity could not be used 
by the technology, therefore it was accumulated in the 
reservoir. During the big August rains the water had to be 
pumped from the reservoir X. into the neighbouring southward 
reservoir X/A. 
It could be achieved so, that in the reservoir X. the storage 
level does not reach before time the permitted storage level 
(216,0 m.a.s.l). This was a technological and economical step, 
because it could be reached so, that beside the maintaining the 
continuous operation the permitted storage levels do not 
exceed in the active reservoirs the permitted storage levels. 
The height of the water head above the red mud was due to a 
sonar measurement, carried out in a boat at 30th September 
2010 was 0,4 - 0,6 m near to the place of the wall failure (it 
was necessary for preventing the dust due to the employed 
technology and with regard to the natural water evaporation). 
At the down of the catastrophe the pumps regulating the 
seepage water were in operation, because the volume of the 
seepage water increased. However in the days before the 
catastrophe it did not rained, but due to the big precipitation 
which fell on the by the curtain walls enclosed area of 274 
hectares (of which the total area of the reservoirs is 174 ha) 
and as consequence of the precipitation at this time the 
seepage water seeped through the reservoirs in the 
underground and filtered into the “reservoir” encircled by the 
curtain walls and indirectly also into the seepage ditches. 
No groundwater seepage, no jets, no water eruption (i.e. on the 
ground level) were observed neither in the vicinity of the soles 
of the dams, nor on higher places, like on the dams. 
The catastrophe occurred on a level, being 0.12 m deeper than 
the storage level, on 215,88 m.a.s.l. This is proved by the 
operational log of the reservoir, what was kept due to the 
prescriptions by the factory. The last entry into the diary was 
written at about 8 hour at Monday: the water level on the 
“water absorbing pipe” is 215,88 m.a.s.l. 
Owing to the site diaries, from 13th September 2010 to 4th 
October the mud injector on the southern side operated. 
During the wall failure the injector Nr. 2. operated on the 
same, southern side. Prior to this, from 24 August until 12 
September injection took place on the north side. 
When the dam breach before the area of the X. reservoir’s 
north side sole, and on the area at on the lower transport road 
at about 12 hour, the water “billowed”. Workers of the Sédex 
Kft., who were working beside the northwest corner of the 
reservoir IX., noticed, that on the shrubby area before the 
northern dam of the reservoir X. the water is streaming and the 
“straw bales are floating on the liquid’s top” 
Two eye witnesses, who stayed in the vicinity, narrated, that 
beside the north-western corner of the reservoir X. – where the 
dam was the highest – in the arched section, and on its 
northern wall, a sparkling pink liquid began to flow out and 
down through a crack which arose on the upper part of the 
dam crest (due to one of the eye-witnesses through a “washed 
out groove”) “which was still not dense”. The developing 
nearly vertical upper crack, a groove subsequent to this, 
extended downward to the sole. Workers, who worked beside 
the reservoir IX., heard a cascade-like voice. The out-flowing 
mud inundated quickly the area near to the corner. The mud 
flowed out at first only through the crack (“through the 
groove”) and dripped down. The high velocity effluent 
disrupted the dam material already cracked due to the loads 
and 5—6 minutes after the discharge, the dam, containing 
rigid, and stiff material suddenly burst, accompanied by a 
strong hubbub. One of the huge ash blocks, flying out in 
northern direction hit and broke the pole of he electricity wires 
in the near. The wires sparked and later got torn. The effluent 
mud broke to huge pieces and swept away the dam materials, 
sweeping it onto the arable land. After the flowing out the 
water level began to sink in the reservoir, therefore it is not 
probable, that the liquid “several minutes long” would sweep 
over the dam, as one of the eyewitnesses believed. As we 
mentioned before, the bigger chunks of the (ash) dam material 
flew more toward north and the most part of the liquid flew 
also in this direction. 
Due to the data so far, the dam breach occurred at 12 hour 14 
min. According the eyewitnesses the “red liquid” reached 
Kolontár within about 10 minutes. 
The northern dam section broke to pieces, beginning from the 
western corner at a length of about 300 m. In the mid of this 
section the outer slope “broke out”, the dam got punctured and 
the red mud flew out through this opening. 
Workers, along the northern section of the junction of the 
reservoirs IX. and X. heard a “hubbub” and the “dam 
trembled” One of the workers, as he said, heard a thump, then 
a strong “explosion”, and saw at a distance that the red mud is 
flowing. When the dam corner collapsed, at first a 20 – 25 m 
wide ”V” shaped gap was formed above (and significantly 
water flew out here), then it grew continuously, got deeper and 
more red mud flew out through it together with the water. The 
flowing out became increasingly louder. After some minutes 
the proximal section of the dam “collapsed” and the muddy 
water flew out of the reservoir beside a strong turbulence. Due 
to one eyewitness at “12 hour 12 minute a 40 m wide rupture 
was visible” and later a further, about 10 m wide section 
disconnected and fell into the mud. Finally the entire, 60 m 
wide dam section broke to pieces. During 15 – 20 minutes 
flew out the red mud from the reservoir and at 12 hours 30 
minutes almost no water was left in the reservoir. The 
“substantial” material flow blow over in a time of 25 – 30 
minutes – according to the eyewitnesses. The water drained 
nearly completely from the reservoir. The remained stumps of 
the western dam wall displayed a breaking surface, which was 
perpendicular to the western axe of the dam, its upper third 
tilted slightly toward the breach. The surface of the northern 
dam’s broken stump had a curious, “L”-shaped breaking 
picture, it was nearly vertical. 
Upon the mud flow, the internal part of the northern dam’s 
damaged section settled. Characteristic, mainly with the dam 
axe parallel cracks were formed. The dam crest level tilted 
inward, beside the outer dam sole longitudinal and diagonal 
cracks were formed, hinting of the dam’s heave. 
The state of the section, remained after the breach of the 
northern dam’s western section deteriorated continuously. The 
cracks of the dam widened, the movements along the nearly 
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vertical cracks increased, the significant crack at the junction 
of the moving and of the not moving northern dam section 





In April, 1981, 128 borings were carried out as part of the Soil 
Mechanical Data Supply presented by the designer. The final 
design plans of the reservoir X were based on these 
explorations among others. Average depths of the borings 
were between 5-7 m.   
As the next design phase, the designer composed an expert 
opinion on preventing the soil-pollution spread caused by the 
reservoir. Additional 25 borings were carried out with an 
average depth of 6-8 m, also used at the design of reservoir X.  
The Data Supply does not contain the coordinates of the 
explorations therefore the accurate positions are unknown. 
Laboratory test reports are also missing. Soil mechanical 
properties can only be gathered from borehole logs. 
The area of the total reservoir is approximately 150 ha 
emerging from the valley between Ajka and Kolontár, 10-22 
metres above these villages. The following general description 
is based on the explorations: the site is covered by an 
anthropogenic fill, which is 1-2 m thick and has varying 
horizontal and vertical extent. The fill’s state and strength 
parameters differ excessively. Mostly, it contains gravelly 
sand and clay. Typical surface layer is the organic, silty fine 
sand, sandy silt from Holocene epoch. It is thicker (4-6 m) on 
the eastern side and gets thinner (0.5-3 m) around reservoir X 
on the western side. The young surface layer is followed by 
coarse grained measure from Quaternary Period. It consists of 
finer grains close to the surface (sandy gravel) and gets coarse 
with depth even containing boulder sized (0.1-0.15 m) 
particles. The bedrock of the area is the so-called Pannonian 
clay. This high-plasticity clay was formed during the filling of 
the Pannonian Sea in the Carpathian Basin. The clay’s 
thickness goes from hundreds of metres as far as few 
kilometres. The dam walls were designed and built from the 
by-product of the power plant: slag and ash. This material has 
considerable hydraulic binding power and has the grain size 
distribution of a silty fine sand. If deposited it becomes hard 
and obtains medium permeability. The designer considered the 
slag and ash homogeneous with an average strength of 453 
kN/m2 after 28 days. Referring to previous tests, the angle of 
friction was considered constant 40°, the value of cohesion 
was derived from unconfined compression tests.     
FUGRO Consult Ltd. carried out 7 borings with continuous 
core sampling near the failure with 10 CPTu soundings after 
the catastrophe (see Figure 5.). Our aim was to obtain 
trustworthy information on the strength parameters of the 
subsoil around the failure and particularly of the deposited red 
mud. 
According top our site investigations and surveying datas 
under the critical NW dam corner the ground surface and also 
the pannonian clay surface gradient is much bigger than any 
other part of the area (see Figure 6.)  
 
Although red mud cannot be considered as soil it is necessary 
to determine soil mechanical parameters in order to perform a 
stability analyses.  
Previous laboratory tests show high standard deviation. 
Friction ratio varies between 0.4-17.0° and cohesion varies 
between 1.5-22.2 kPa, which were depends on the water 
content of the red mud. 
Since red mud is a highly alkaline material reacting, for 
instance, with aluminium, therefore it was not heavily used in 






Fig. 5. Site investigations after the catastrophe 
 
 
Fig. 6. Gradient of the surface level by the NW dam corner 
 
The triaxial tests carried out after the catastrophe defined the 
shear strength parameters as φ=2.13°; c=14.8 kPa. 
Nevertheless, it is essential to mention that red mud is highly 
sensitive to changes in moisture content. 
To verify the friction ratio of red mud we also used the 
hydrometric measures performed in the reservoir. Based on 
the measures the angle of spread was around 1.2-2.8°, which 
correlated well with the triaxial test results. 
Defining the strength parameters of the dam was also vital and 
was absolutely unknown before. Our site surveys showed that 
dams built with the hydro-mechanization technology and are 
utterly inhomogeneous, and thus the structure became 
stratified. The layers can be observed on Figure 7.  
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Fig. 7.  Dam section by the rapture 
 
To determine the dam’s strength properties we performed the 
so called Schmidt hammer tests (widely used for testing 
structural strength of concrete structures), an in-situ non-
destructive test. The correlation between the dam’s strength 
properties and the measured Schmidt rebound numbers has 
been established according to EN 13791:2007 referring to 
concrete structures. The applied relation, and the matching 
strength parameters and rebound numbers of the tested dam 
elements is shown on Figure 8, where the red dots are the 
calibration values, and the blue dots are the measured values 
of the dam.  
 
Fig. 8. Strength of the dam 
  
There is a wide range of differences in the strength parameters 
of the intact northern dam wall (б=200-3500 kPa). Based on 
the measurements and results the average strength of the 
collapsed western wall was no more than б=200-600 kPa. 
Figure 9. demonstrates the sensitivity to moisture content 
change in the dam. The core of the boring near the failure 
contains slag and ash losing its strength due to alkaline water, 
and thus becoming soft and degrading.   
 
 
Fig. 9. Completely soft dam part 
 
Laboratory tests have also been performed, complementing 
the in-situ measurements. It was possible to obtain solid 
blocks of slag and ash from the failure surroundings. The 
following conclusions were made based on the performed 
unconfined compression tests. The samples gained from the 
borings were loaded perpendicular to the stratigraphy. After 
the first cracks the sample could not bear more load and brittle 
fracture happened, as shown in Figure 10.  
Samples of the blocks were also loaded parallel to the 
stratigraphy. After the first vertical cracks appeared the 
samples could still bear load (see Figure 11). Failure only 
occurred after the fracture of the strongest plate or layer, 
usually with brittle fracture.  
 
Fig. 10. Cracked dam sample 
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Fig. 11. Unconfined compression test 
 
Based on the in situ and laboratory tests the slag and ash dam 
proved to be a rigid structure due to hydro-mechanization. 
Small deformations are followed by an abrupt brittle failure 
without any warning sign.  
It became vital to find relationship between the strength and 
deformation parameters of the dam and the clay deposit laying 
and supporting underneath. Figure 12. shows connection 
between the strength and moisture content of the clay subsoil, 
pointing out how strength reduces while moisture content 
rises, regardless of the plasticity. The average values of the 
tests are б=213 kPa; w=30%. On a sample from the 80 cm 
thick layer of clay under the failure, these parameters are 
б=174.6 kPa; w=54% (see red dots on Fig. 12.), meaning the 
strength of the soaked clay is significantly lower. 
 
Fig. 12. Strength properties of the clay 
 
It is essential to be familiar with the deformations in order to 
understand the brittle fracture mechanism. Figure 13. shows 
the unconfined compression test results both on slag and clay 
samples. While the dam’s strength ends around ε=1-4% by an 
abrupt brittle fracture, clays’ strength ceases after a slow 
creeping phenomenon after ε=10-25% vertical deformation.  
 
 
Fig. 13. Strain values of the clay and the dam  
 
On the grounds of our tests, measurements and in-situ 
observations, the probable boundaries of the dam strength can 
be defined as follows.  
From the crest near the flooded (inner) part to the toe of dam 
on the protected (external) part the dam’s strength varies 
between 1000-3000 kPa. This consists of approximately one-
third of the dam’s section, and is likely to be mainly 
unsaturated (see on Figure 14. Zone 1). The strength of the 
remaining two-third part is around 100-500 kPa. From the 
crest to level 202.0 mBf the strength of the saturated part is 
around 300-500 kPa (Zone 2.), and underneath that level, until 
the bottom, it is even lower, at around 0-500 kPa (Zone 3.). It 
is understood that these estimated strength values do not have 
a uniform distribution, but appear highly varying throughout 
the dam structure.  Since the dam structure is highly 
inhomogeneous, the strength values differ by at least 1 but 
rather 2 orders of magnitude. 
 





The area is situated in the valley of Torna creek with Csinger 
creek and Padragi stream running into it. Groundwater flows 
west from northest in the valley that tends to east - west. The 
bases of the creeks’ erosion are Torna talus and Torna bed 
cited on the deepest zones of the area resulting in an eastern 
flow direction. 
Regime of the area is highly affected by precipitation, its 
infiltration and the surface water’s flow towards the deepest 
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point, thus by the water of Torna.  
The creek was diverted from its original path in 1990 to south 
of the reservoirs, parallel with the relocated railway line. It 
reaches the area from northeast and flows towards Kolontár. 
Figure 15. shows the groundwater flow directions of the area 
based on 2010’s first half-year data. 
 





According to standards the precipitation of the area sealed by 
the diaphragm wall must have been collected and lifted up to 
the surface of reservoir X. Therefore it is crucial to know the 
exact amount of precipitation. A precipitation measurement 
station, called Ajka 135, monitored this. After January 1, 
2006, the precipitation was registered by the factory’s 
measurement station. Based on the data collected, the total 
amount’s annual average between 1965 and 2009 was 714mm, 
the maximum was 958 mm (2007) and the minimum was 495 
mm (2000). The data collected by the Hungarian Central 
Institute of Meteorology (OMSZ) between October 1997 and 
October 2010 are shown on Figure 16., broken down by 6 
month long periods.  
 
Fig. 16. Distribution of rainwater in 6 months periods 
 
It is clear that before the catastrophe the precipitation was 




Average wind speed and maximum wind gusts were registered 
on the day of the catastrophe. In the 4th of October after a 
calm night the wind started to blow and the wind force 
reached its maximum exactly when the dam wall collapsed.  
At that time the average of the wind speed was 28,8 km/h, 
while the maximum wind gust was 48,3 km/h. The wind was 




Ajka lies on an area of Hungary considered seismically calm.  
The nearest area, which has been active before, is in 45-50 km 
distance, called Berhida, or further areas of Bérbaltavár and 
Várpalota.  Notably, low activity has been registered in this 
area during the observed period of January 1, 2000 and 
October 4, 2010 at Pápa, Csót, and Pápasalamon. 
Locations of the activities within 50 km diameter of the area 
(47° 05' 20.19" N; 17° 29' 43.76" E) can be seen on Figure 17. 
in the above mentioned time period. 
 
Fig. 17. Earthquakes in the region 
 
The Hungarian earthquake observation system has registered 
115 earthquakes in the first 8 months of 2010, 72 of them 
within 100 km of the dam's area.  A map of these locations is 
shown on Figure 18. The lowest magnitude was ML=0.5, 
while the highest was ML=2.7 (ML: local Richter magnitude). 
Most of them were micro quakes centred in the area of Móri 
Trench. 
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Fig. 18. Earthquakes in the bigger region 
 
Based on approximations the maximum horizontal seismic soil 
velocity caused by these activities was 0.0327 m/s2 assuming 
loose surface deposits. 
 
 
Water level and quantity on the Reservoir X. 
 
According to the licenses all of the leaking water must be 
pumped back to the area of reservoir X. It was required that on 
the area of reservoir X must be min. 0.5 m water over the red 
mud.   
Red mud has been transported to the reservoir via pipe system 
from the factory site. The red mud has been blown circularly 
to the inner slopes of the reservoir for slushing the surface. 
Ideally the water depth increases from the edges to the centre 
inside the reservoir.  In the middle of the reservoir the water 
depth was more than 8 meter, but by the dam crest only 0.5 m 
(see Figure 19.)! We made a few 3D calculations, to determine 
the total stored water quantity. Considering the regualtions it 
must be stored min. 850.000 m3 of water in the reservoir X. 
From the site measurements the angle of friction of the wet red 






The caustic, highly alkaline red mud is the by-product of 
hydrate production.  Figure 20. shows the annual distribution 
of alkaline concentration based on available information. 
There is a close to linear increase starting from 2000, which 
reached 4g/l Na2Oö in 2002.  It is equivalent with pH value 13, 
and the increase continued. 
It is important to note that diaphragm walls were erected in 
order to seal the area of the reservoirs.  The walls were 
finished in 2000 and, as the diagram shows, the alkaline 
concentration began to increase afterwards, up to 100 per cent.  
The bottom of the reservoirs were not lined thus the NaOH 
could continuously dissolve from the red mud. 
  
 
Fig. 19. Depth of the water over the reservoir X. 
 
 
Fig. 20. pH increase from the year 2000. 
 
 
Mineralogical analysis of clay 
 
Mineralogical analyses were also performed on the clay 
subsoil after the catastrophe. The question was if the highly 
alkaline leachate affected the properties of the clay layers 
underneath the dam.  On the upper zone of the clay layers, 
tests showed a considerable amount of salt soluble in water. 
Most of these salts were sodium salts due to constant effect of 
caustic soda. Increasing sodium hydroxide concentration 
makes cation exchange more active.  When calcium exchanges 
to sodium, the ratio of adsorbed sodium-cation increases, 
which leads to reduction in the mechanical properties of clay, 
specifically of its cohesion. X-ray diffraction and 
derivatograph tests drew our attention to the fact, that the main 
mineral of the critical high plasticity clay layer is sodium-
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montmorillonite, probably caused by the leachate.  
As is commonly known, clays containing sodium have low 
shear strength and high compressibility. In other words, after 
the facility began to operate, the clay layer’s strength 




STABILITY ANALYSIS, 3D FEM MODEL 
 
The goal of this investigation was to complete stability 
analysis using the original data and the new data gained after 
the accident.  We controlled the designer’s original analysis 
with finite element method (Plaxis 2D) and with classical 
methods as well.  Four sections’ stability has been checked by 
the designer, two of them from the northern wall (I-I, III-III), 
one from the western (IX-IX) and one from the southern (VI-
VI) wall. In case the dam wall is considered impermeable – as 
the designer assumed - the safety factor is at least 1.5, which is 
required by Hungarian regulations regarding stability.  But 
since the dam wall is inhomogeneous and permeable, the 
safety factor reduces dramatically (see Figure 21.), which was 




Fig. 21. Safety factors 
This could bring forth the question: why was the dam stable 
for many years?  A logical explanation is that the corner of the 
dam was acting like a rigid spatial structure able to bear high 
specific tension, unlike soils.  We run the 3D calculation both 
with the original and the new data.  Assuming the reservoir is 
filled up until level 215.88 mBf, the result with the original 
parameters was n=1.02.  The maximum allowed level was 
216.00 mBf.  Using the new parameters, according to our 
calculations the dam corner cannot resist the load from the 
215.88 level fill, and collapses (see Figure 22.).  
 
Fig. 22. 3D FEM Analysis 
 
The comparison of the failure mode from our calculation and 
the actual pictures taken after the catastrophe confirms our 
calculation method (see Fig. 23). 
 
 




In order to provide profound answers for the causes of the 
October 4, 2010 dam rapture of red mud reservoir X, it is 
imperative to specify all factors by topic and process that 
contributed to the accident.  These factors, in chronological 
order, were the followings: 
• Original siting of facility 





• Periodic review of license (monitoring, license renewal 
by responsible authorities/regulators) 




One of the primer investments in Hungarian industry during 
the late 1970s has been the Ajka Alumina Factory and the 
 Paper No. 3.14a              12 
extension of its operational capacities.  It was one of the major 
sources of hard currency generation for the Socialist 
Economic Machinery.  In light of this it is easy to imagine 
how the highest levels of political and economic decision-
making and their mechanisms pressed these investments. 
During capacity extension the correct risk assessment, in 
relation to building reservoir X, the characterisation of these 
risks by the size of potential effects and the probability of 
failures have not been professionally performed.  Specific 
attention should have been given to the so-called external risk 
factors, such as the various environmental effects to the 
structure(s), as well as due considerations to population 
exposures to potential pollution and/or catastrophic events.  To 
our knowledge there is no written information that has 
systematically assessed this vital subject of any large-scale 
developmental program. 
On the other hand there were prevention plans prepared for 
catastrophic flood event at the two closest municipalities to the 
factory, Devecser and Kolontár, assuming the risk arising 
from reservoir X.  In the Northern section of Kolontár, which 
has been hardest hit during the actual catastrophe, there was an 
evacuation plan.  Nevertheless, during the decades, several 
homes were allowed to get built on the very area known to 
have exposed to flood in a catastrophic event. 
The fact that reservoir X was built on a site already 10 meters 
above Kolontár situated only 1 kilometre away and the 
enormous quantity of red mud is going to be raised by over 
another 20 meters was known.  Therefore is was clear that in 
case of an accident that material had to flow towards the low 
area, thus risk to human life was considerable. 
Further it is important to note that reservoir X has been 
designed to an area with varied geological and soil mechanical 
conditions, where groundwater is at around ground level, 
Torna creek had to be diverted from its original path, and there 
was a marshy area just where the critical Northern wall of the 
reservoir has got built. 
The only reasonable standpoint on which this siting could be 
based on was that it was a logical continuation next to the 
already existing reservoir(s) toward the West side.  Without a 
doubt, the decision for this siting was strongly motivated by 
micro-economic and financial considerations. 
It can be reasonably stated that risks to human population has 
been gravely underestimated during siting of this large project.  
The decision-making process, driven purely by perceived 
economic benefit, has been settled till the late 1980s and got 





Assessment from the point of view of standards Construction 
design documentation satisfies respective geotechnical 
investigation standards as to the frequency of measurement 
points; however, their required depth has not been met.  
Moreover, verification testing has not been correctly 
performed.  The design documents submitted to the authorities 
for commissioning the new facility lacked structural stability 
assessment and its verification prescribed by the valid 
standards of the 1980s (let alone today’s standards). 
Assessment by content Based on review of various design 
documents a number of contradictions have been found.  One 
of the mistakes found was that stability assessments have been 
performed for an area 32-48 m East of actual construction of 
the reservoir.  Actual altitude of the critical Northwest wall 
section is also off by the order of magnitude of a meter 
compared to the design documents. 
As prescribed in the design document the analyses of power 
plant ashes for their suitability as construction materials have 
been conducted only in laboratory conditions, and there was 
no in situ verification of expected performance, regardless of 
the fact that the walls were built from inhomogeneous 
materials. 
Foundation design was clearly insufficient.  In fact no 
foundation has been designed and built, except the removal of 
topsoil to 0.30 m (for a structure tens of meters high!) and its 
refill and compression after the extraction of humus.  
Therefore, as due assessment of geometries and subsoil 
conditions have been performed, it became clear that reservoir 
X has not satisfied the standard for structural endurance and 
safety (1.50), or even for basic stability (1.00) at designed 
maximum reservoir load.  Moreover, after planned 
recultivation, the load level would have reached an extra 1 
meter – accounting for extra about 100 kN/m further load on 
the instable structure. 
As the designer has not recognised the inherent risk of his 
work the reservoir has had only minor safety reserves (1.02 - 
1.08, thus 2 - 8 %) for its structural integrity.  Even this slight 
reserve was not designed deliberately but was the result of 





Authorities commissioned the reservoir X without seeing the 
necessary fully-fledged stability and safety assessments 





Besides or rather arising from the deficiencies in the design, 
construction technology has not been controlled correctly.  It 
can be stated that the foundation of the dam has been 
performed unprofessionally. 
Foundation depth should have been adjusted to the 
heterogeneous soil properties indicated by geotechnical 
investigations.  Beside the upper humus layer, all poor shear 
strength materials should have been removed, and water 
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In this phase regulators have known not only the design 
documentation but the realisation records during construction.  
Regulators could have intervened at several times and 
provided additional guidelines and orders for strengthening 
built in and operational safety, for instance via advanced 
monitoring systems.  Nevertheless, we could recover no sign 
of such construction time or ex-post intervention.  Meanwhile 
the factory has maintained its production and received its 





Based on the information we have got access to we can state 
that the operation of reservoir X has met the prescribed and 
licensed/commissioned operating parameters and pertaining 
standard(s). 
There was no designer prescription or regulatory obligation 
found for the maximum allowed water level for reservoir X. 
The stored quantity of water, according to our calculations 
based on actual measurements (according to workbook logs), 
was 853.000 m3.  Its height reached 215.88 mBf, 0.12 m 
below the allowed maximum level. 
This water volume at the time of accident corresponded to 
technologies to be followed according to design parameters 
and regulatory obligation. 
 
Maintenance of leachate trench According to available 
information the maintenance of leachate trench has been 
correctly managed.  Its smooth operation was proven by the 
continuous working of the pumps.  While preceeding the 
catasrophe the two pump pairs operated over their normal 
operating conditions, however, this has happened before 
without any problem, thus were considered an acceptable 
state.  Therefore this increased pump activity cannot be 
considered as an uneqvivocal precursor of the catastrophe. 
 
Operation of the red mud intake pipe network Red mud was 
transported in liquid state through the pipes.  Congestion 
phenomena is out of question under the temperature 
conditions of Hungary’s climatic zone (between -20 C° and 
+40 C°.  There was no congestion recorded in the past 10 
years.  
Two or three times a year, from technological reasons, the 
factory has stopped its production.  In these occasions the 
materials inside the pipe system have been high pressure air 
blowed towards the reservoir.  As the factory has been in 
normal production during the catastrophy, it is even 
theoretically impossible that any congestion occured in the 
system. 
 
The role of dam crest level adjustments in July 2010, as part of 
the reservoir X’s normal operation This dam crown level 
increase was in line with the orginal design and regulatory 
licence, therefore it cannot be thought of as te application of 
extra weight to the structure. 
This levelling has started 50-100 m away from the  
northwestern corner on the norht wall.  It was not due to 
uneaven settlement in the dam wall, but to the original 
construction level anomaly compared to other sections of the 
walls.  As the red mud and water level increased, this 
adjustment became necessary for utlizing maximum allowed 
and licenced reservoir storage capacity. 
If the reservoir has the required overall structural safety level, 
this levelling can have no negative influence on its integrity. 
In case the red mud reservoir was at or below its designed 
safety level (equillibrium limit), it could still not fail due to 
this additional levelling, as them hightened dam structure has 
tood strong months after this corrective measure. 
 
 
Periodic license reviews  
 
There has been no new regulatory requirement, order, or 
changing respective standard till the fault occurred at reservoir 
X, so the operator has not had to overview the original plans 
for its activities. 
Monitoring We are not aware of any geotechnical monitoring 
plan that would have addressed deformations in the body of 
the dam system, prescribed by any designer, expert consultant, 
or regulatory body up till October 4, 2010. 
According to the documents we got access to, the competent 
water authority has not thought such a monitoring system 
would be necessary to maintain technical safety, or at least has 
not requested it from the factory. 
It was likely due to policy deficiency that the designer in the 
1990s has not included monitoring systems in his design and 
that regulator(s) have not requested it later for safe operating 
conditions. 
Regarding the necessity of monitoring it is important to 
mention that making a decision on whether geotechnical 
monitoring is needed or not, and if needed, what type of 
method(s) and system(s) to use, requires geotechnical 
expertise.  In order to make an educated decision the dam’s 
physical properties have to be understood and thus what kind 
of failure(s) may be faced (e.g., rigid or creeping).    This 
requires competence and substantiation from the designer, 
involved experts, regulators, as well as from standardization.  
Creating the necessary framework conditions is not the 
responsibility of the plant operators.  As the regulatory and 
legal framework for monitoring has been deficient, neither the 
designer nor the regulator have enforced further preventive 
measures to the operation of the reservoir, most likely because 
nobody presumed the facility having not sufficient safety 
level.  It is rather unfortunate that only after the accident – 
along tedious and profound geotechnical investigations – was 
realized that this sufficient level of safety was not present. 
The results of our investigations have pointed to the 
recognition that the dam’s material exerts rigid failure 
behaviour, and thus the hazard signalling potential of a 
monitoring system is rather low.  The changes to sense would 
be so sudden that there would be no realistic chance to 
effectively intervene before rapture occurs. 
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Renewal of licenses According to available information the 
factory has been operating with valid licenses, with the 
necessary periodic (annual) license renewals.  Therefore 
regulators had the opportunity to review the safety of these 
operations and request, in light of reported data and assessed 
processes and tendencies, further investigations, testing, and 
the introduction of safety improvements from the operator. 
 
 
Potential external causes 
 
Effect of slurry wall to increasing alkali concentration and 
ensuing changes in the consistency of clay base Slurry walls 
have been completed in 2000 due to environmental 
considerations (on the order of the regulator).  Since this a 
linear function in alkalinity growth can be traced in the 
concentrations of heap and leachate waters.  In 2004 the 
concentration reached pH 13.  This has interfered – through 
cation exchange – with the shear strength, important from the 
point of view of structural integrity, of the surfacing clay base 
containing Na-montmorillonite below the Northwest corner of 
reservoir X.  And thus a soapy slide has been formed just 
below the Northwest corner of the reservoir dam. 
While the slurry wall frame has been prescribed by the 
environmental regulator, in order to avoid groundwater and 
then soil pollution of surrounding agricultural land, to our 
knowledge, nobody has researched the potential effect of such 
a structure on the structural integrity of the dam.  It seems – 
from retrospect - that with this decision a non-deliberate trade 
off happened between environmental and geotechnical safety 
criteria.  It can be stated that the slurry walls acted as catalyser 
of the cation exchange and degradation of soil physical 
conditions. 
It is also a fact that this reservoir has been designed to store 
alkali. 
 
Role of seismicity There was no seismic event recorded on the 
day of accident at the Ajka area. 
However, it is a fact that during the year before the dam 
failure there have been 17 small events recorded of 0.7-2.7 
magnitude (ML) in a 100 km diameter circle, of which 5 have 
been 1.7-2.7 ML in the few months preceding the accident.  In 
contrast, there have been only 22 such events recorded in a 50 
km diameter circle around the factory during the preceding 10 
years. 
This dam was built of inhomogeneous materials, framed in 
several sequences, with minimum safety reserves, behaving as 
a rigid spatial structure that has been subjected to 5 
considerable quakes in 5 months.  Due to this, at its weak 
points, e.g. at its sequential construction joints, cracks (not 
necessarily detectible externally by eye) might have generated 
and or existing cracks might have become more significant. 
While these relatively small earthquakes cannot be made 
responsible directly for the dam failure, it is logical to suspect 
that they have contributed to the break of this rigid, 
inhomogeneous structure. 
 
Role of precipitation According to calibrated measurements, 
during the catastrophe preceding 6 months, from 838 mm 
(according to the National Meteorological Service, 5 km away 
from the site) to 908 mm (according to the factory’s own 
meteorological system) precipitation occurred on the site of 
214 acres framed by slurry walls built on the request of the 
environmental regulator, of which 174 acres are the total size 
of red mud reservoirs.  The average precipitation of the 
preceding 44 years has been 714 mm.  This precipitation level 
fallen during the 6 months pre-accident equals to an expected 
(and thus designed) incidence frequency of 3000 years! 
This extraordinary quantity of water, naturally, has been 
influencing the water balance and hydraulics of the area, 
including raising groundwater, reservoir stored water and 
leachate levels.  It has significantly changed the hydraulics 
inside the slurry wall frame. 
It is a fact that even this unusual precipitation has not in itself 
caused problem for reservoir operation, as the allowed 
maximum storing capacity has never been exceeded.  On the 
other hand it is also a fact that groundwater was very close to 
ground level at the critical north-western corner of reservoir 
X.  This is important as this heightened groundwater level has 
further saturated the clay base surface already weakened by 
cat-ion exchanges due to high alkalinity of red mud, on a 
sloping surface. 
 
Role of wind Assessing wind data during the day of dam 
failure (October 4, 2010) from 00:00 to 13:00 wind blew from 
Southeast to Northwest direction towards the breakage.  This 
isn’t the prevailing wind direction of this area but in the exact 
opposing direction, which has turned so in the accident 
preceding days. 
Wind pressure has continuously increased and wind gusts 
reached their peaks of 13,4 m/s (48,24 km/h) at around 12:00, 
just when the dam failure occurred. 
It is clear that wind pressure influences negatively structural 
safety.  While we talk about a relatively small factor here, it 
has clearly been one of the converging risk factors in the 
event. 
In fact, this wind gust was the only factor in complete 
synchrony with the occurrence of the dam rapture.  While in 
itself may be a small factor, it has likely caused a butterfly 





Thus the failure of this reservoir structure was due to the 
converging factors of poor siting, design, construction, as well 
as regulatory deficiencies, and unfavourable environmental 
conditions. 
 
“The stability of reservoir X was provided by nature, and 
taken away by nature.” 
  
